'For as long as man's habits and memories and ideals carry forward past patterns, this heritage exerts a lasting impress on the subsequent evolution of the social order.' Managerial revolutions -which witness the appropriation of corporate power by professional managers -come in different shapes and sizes. This article argues that the stereotypical 'managerial revolution', the term adopted by Chandler as the subtitle to his classic text The Visible Hand (1977), and associated with the United States, differs in important respects from those of other countries. 2 In the case of post-war France, the rise of the corporate economy and the flowering of managerialism were not the natural products of competitive pressures, but rather of economic and social engineering on the part of the ruling elite. 3 The article demonstrates, through the inclusion of original data
and a business historical case study, which illuminates the essential features of the system, that the French model of capitalism has three features that set it apart and are fundamental to its modus operandi. The first is the significant participation of the state and other companies in the equity of top companies, which brings with it an entitlement to representation on the boards. The second is the nexus of relations that exist between leading companies in the form of director interlocks. The third is the large number of elite actors with direct experience of working in an executive capacity in both the public and private sectors, in marked contrast to countries like the UK. In France, the managerial class is unified across the public-private divide by common educational experiences and a shared ideology of national self-interest. In addition, family ownership remains important in France.
This article stems from a cross-nationally comparative research project, Business Elites and Corporate Governance in France and the UK. The project has been conducted by the authors since 1999 and consists of four related sub-projects: first, a study of the institutional histories of the top 100 companies in 1998 in France and the UK respectively; second, a prosopographical study of the education, qualifications, careers, roles and responsibilities of 2,291 directors of the top 100 French and UK companies; third, an in-depth study of the social backgrounds and accomplishments of the top 100 most powerful directors in France and the UK respectively, analysing their social origins and career trajectories; and fourth, a study of the social reality of business elites based upon a set of semi-structured interviews with past and present business leaders in France and the UK. 4 A 'census date' of 1 January 1998 was selected to ascertain organisational and individual membership of the corporate elites of France and the UK. The top 100 companies in each country were identified as possessing the greatest amounts of 'corporate power', defined as 'command over resources' -financial, physical, human, intellectual, social and symbolic (see note to Table 2 ). 5 Membership of the business elite was confined to individuals with decisional authority at the summit of top 100
companies. Data were gathered from a wide range of publicly available sources on each of the directors identified as belonging to the business elites of France and the UK in 1998.
The article builds upon existing critiques of Chandler's universal theory of the managerial revolution with reference to the French national business system. It draws upon several aspects of the research to demonstrate that the concept of the managerial revolution is best understood within specific cultural contexts, elite ideologies and national business systems. The main point of comparison is the UK.
Managerialism as Ideology and Organisational Imperative
The transfer of corporate power from owners to professional managers in advanced industrial societies has fascinated business historians and economists since the 1930s.
Ever since companies grew large enough to warrant the appointment of salaried managers to run them, bringing about a separation of ownership and control, problems of governance potentially have existed. The 'managerial revolution' observed by Berle and Means in the US in 1929, caused by a growing dispersal in shareholdings, was deemed to be incomplete due to the continuing influence exerted in the boardroom by minority shareholders, often relatives of founding entrepreneurs. 6 As share ownership became increasingly dispersed, so, it was argued, would the divorce of ownership and control near completion, allowing managers to act unchecked. Principal-and-agent issues might arise, with executives able to substitute their own managerial goals for the profitmaximising goals of company owners, leading in turn to a potential abuse of power to the benefit of managers, no longer acting in the best interests of owners or employees. 7 The managerial thesis, however, has flaws and limitations, which are well documented. Chandler's research focused essentially on the American industrial corporation in the first half of the twentieth century. As Whittington et al. point out,
Chandler's framework is fundamentally universalistic and his argument 'without geography'. 8 His thesis has been criticised for losing its empirical support in crossing the Atlantic without being modified. 9 Scale and Scope (1990) went some way towards recognising this, examining industrial enterprise in Germany, Britain and the US, and distinguishing between their various brands of capitalism, characterised respectively as 'cooperative managerial', 'personal' and 'competitive managerial capitalism'. The advantages of American competitive capitalism, however, are emphasised over those of the other two models. 10 The European visible hand, Hannah observes, is misrepresented in Chandler's 'distorting mirror'.
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Moreover, while some commentators regard the Chandlerian model as able to withstand the passage of time, 12 others take a different view. Langlois argues that
Chandler's portrayal of the managerial revolution does not extend well into the present, and that the 'visible hand' has given way to the 'vanishing hand' -driven by technological developments and the globalisation of increasingly disembodied marketsnow in danger of 'fading into ghostly translucence'. 13 Langlois concludes that the managerial revolution applies to a particular moment in time: 'Far from being a historical trend, the managerial revolution … is a temporary episode that arose in a particular era'.
Lazonick, meanwhile, points to the need to adopt a deeper and broader perspective on types of organisational structure by extending the analysis across nations and over time 'to understand new modes of business organisation that generate innovation'. 14 Europe, after all, has its own traditions of organisational structure, with
France in particular having a long tradition of state involvement in the economy, dating back to Colbert (1619-1683), an enlightened supporter of fledgling industries and commerce. 15 He lends his name to the long-standing French tradition of state intervention in the economy through discriminatory fiscal and public procurement policies, designed to favour and protect public and private national champions, and nascent industries, in order that they might withstand foreign competition. The principal objective of French industrial policy in the post-war period was commercial success in the international marketplace through high-tech Colbertism. The state bolstered its 'national champions'
(champions nationaux) in industries perceived to be of the future with grants and public procurement measures designed to provide secure markets. The general interestnational sovereignty, national defence and technological autonomy -has been customarily proffered as justification for what might be termed 'offensive protectionism'. 16 Ownership and control, moreover, are not sharply separated in many companies and national business systems. By the 1970s it was being suggested that the separation of ownership and control in the US might itself be greatly exaggerated, with the element of private ownership of the large majority of firms being disregarded without having been 6 investigated. 17 The French and British brands of corporate capitalism have resulted in very different ownership patterns. In France, we can observe the continuation down to the present of extensive family and state ownership (see Table 1 ). In the UK, the overwhelming tendency has been for ownership to become widely distributed amongst multiple shareholders, reflecting the accumulation of private sector savings in the hands of pension, insurance and investment companies. These fund holders spread their risks by distributing funds widely between companies. In France, this tendency is far less pronounced, and in consequence banks, dominant corporations, and powerful individuals in effect control large numbers of companies. As Table 1 Our research has established that the French and British top 100 companies in 1998 were collectively of approximately the same size (in terms of turnover, employment and total capital employed). 33 These surface similarities, however, belie deeper structural differences. Table 2 highlights some of the major differences and similarities that exist in the developmental trajectories of the French and British corporate economies.
[Insert France, the sector has never exerted the same dominating influence that it has across the Channel. 34 Utilities and telecommunications are also heavily weighted in France relative to Britain, reflecting continued protectionism and other forms of support for such companies in France, whereas British companies have been far more exposed to international competition. 35 Other interesting contrasts include the importance of consumer goods producers and food and drink conglomerates within the UK corporate economy, as well as the strength nationally and internationally of French retailing companies. One of the most interesting similarities is the high weighting of extractive (including oil and gas) and materials handling companies in both countries.
[Insert Table 3 
Managerialism and the Ruling Elite: the Case of Electricité de France
The case of Electricité de France (EdF) demonstrates continuity in French policy, and usefully highlights the essential features of the system. These include strategic initiatives driven by the ruling elite; long-term thinking on a large-scale fuelled by the dual imperatives of national energy security and the saving of foreign exchange; technological and capital intensity; internationalisation; and the French 'take' on managerialism and corporate hierarchies. EdF provides an excellent illustration of the kind of state support from which French utilities typically benefit, their pan-European and global strategies being supported at home by closed and quasi-monopolistic markets, often in direct contravention of European Union (EU) directives. energy supplies were seen as quintessential to economic recovery and prosperity. As
General de Gaulle explained, 'the country's activity depended on coal, electricity, gas and petroleum, and would eventually depend on atomic fission and in order to bring
France's economy to the level that progress demanded these resources must be developed on the largest possible scale. Expenditure and efforts were necessary, therefore, which only the state was in a position to realize and nationalization was a necessity.' French electricity production expanded considerably in the 1980s, such that production in 1998 was almost twice its 1980 level. Electricity production benefited from the huge cost reductions derived from cheap nuclear energy, confirming the financial wisdom of France's heavy investment in nuclear power in the 1970s and 1980s (if not its environmental sense). In the 1980s, France overtook Japan and the former USSR to become the world's second largest producer of electricity generated from nuclear energy, behind only the US. 37 In 1998 almost half (46 per cent) of nuclear-generated electricity in the EU was produced by France's network of 58 nuclear plants, with EdF producing some 76 per cent of its energy from nuclear power stations. 38 Self-sufficiency in energy is a prodigious achievement for a country with little gas and almost no oil. The pursuit and ultimate achievement of self-sufficiency was the French reaction to the oil crisis, which 25 years previously had sent the country reeling into a decade-long recession. The contrast with the UK, which has benefited since 1975 from North Sea oil, now beginning to run out, is salient. With self-sufficiency in energy acquired, EdF and its fellow state monopoly, Gaz de France (GdF), set about capturing international markets through export and acquisition. 39 In doing so, they benefited from state ownership coupled with closed, de facto monopolistic markets at home. This protected position allowed them to take full advantage of market liberalisation elsewhere in the EU with relative impunity, to the bitter resentment of energy producers in neighbouring EU member states, such as Germany, Spain and the UK. 40 In 1996, Edmond Alphandéry, the newly appointed PDG (following a two-year period In short, EdF has used government finance terms to acquire assets abroad, engaging in a strategy of state-funded international expansion. It has been operating for the past decade in commercial spheres, but not on commercial terms, being (until Ironically, the motivation behind the sell-off was the need to raise a further 7 billion euros to finance EdF's continuing expansion in Europe. 45 This state-sponsored strategy has proved highly effective for manipulating the rules of the game, highlighting two of the key characteristics of French capitalism. These are, first, the readiness of the state and ruling elite to manage the competitive landscape in favour of French firms; 46 and second, the elite cohesion which serves the collective interests of French business, and which is institutionally embedded and served, in turn, by the state.
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Social Stratification and the Making of the French Managerial Class
The ways in which managerial hierarchies are established in France very much reflect other social processes that endorse social stratification and status distinctions. Education, in particular, mirrors the situation in business organisations and government departments.
It is the basis of ideological coherence amongst French managerial, business and ruling elites, explaining the closeness of the ties between big business and the state, amply illustrated by the EdF case. Table 4 provides a summation of the educational backgrounds and career experiences of the French managerial class, compiled from data relating to main board level executive directors of top 100 companies in France and the UK in 1998.
[Insert Table 4 The Managerial Elites of France and the UK in 1998 about here.] Table 4 This concentration of elite establishments in Paris and its surrounding area is extraordinary. Though it may have led in the past to accusations of a two-tier nation, 49 the domination of the capital has itself played a critical role in fostering strong ties among the French business elite, being home to the best schools and higher education institutions, the key organs of government and the headquarters of most leading companies.
For students who excel, attendance at a grande école may be followed by the invitation to join one of the civil service grand corps, such as the Inspection des Finances, the Corps des Mines or the Corps des Ponts et Chaussées. These serve as funnels to channel the cream of the grandes écoles to the top jobs, playing a pivotal role in the selection and education of the elite in the business, administrative, political and military domains. 50 They function as a sort of extended family, encouraging an esprit de caste, again strengthening the tight-knit ties amongst the ruling elite.
Regarding the mix of career experience that best fits people out for elevation to the uppermost echelons of management, by far the largest part of the elite was drawn in both countries from within the ranks of career corporate executives. A significant minority in France, however, was drawn from the pool of individuals with high-level experience in public administration (16.6 per cent), a phenomenon almost unknown in the UK, exemplifying the strong links between the state and business in France. A relatively small proportion of UK elite members had a professional background of some kind, far more than in France. The managerial context in which individual careers were forged was far more diverse in France than in the UK, reflecting the continued significance of the state, families and co-operatives in the corporate world.
Finally, Table 4 shows that a large majority of members of the managerial elite in both countries have very little leadership experience beyond the confines of their own enterprise. In the UK, the practice is for one and occasionally two non-executive directorships to be permitted for senior directors towards the end of their managerial career. In France, the situation is very similar apart from members of the 'super-elite', the elite within the elite, the PDG of the very largest companies. These individuals typically hold multiple non-executive directorships, forming a bridge between the top teams of the most powerful French companies (see Table 5 , below).
Corporate Networks and Institutional Cohesion
The ideological coherence fostered by the French system of elite recruitment, outlined above, ensures that the ruling elite is composed of like-minded individuals, capable of concerted action. Moreover, the central role of the state in this education needs to be underscored. The top lycées mentioned above are state schools, not independent 'public' schools, as in the UK. The grandes écoles were created by the state, and serve the state, as do the grands corps. The state is central to the selection process. 51 The brightest students who have successfully made it through the grandes écoles repay their 'debt' to the state by working for it for a number of years in some capacity, perhaps at the Treasury, or in a ministerial cabinet, before moving on, as many of them do, to the world of business. As Roger Fauroux, a former director of ENA and a former Minister of Industry, puts it: 'French organizations are run by the nation's star pupils'. 52 An essential element of the training experienced by gifted individuals at elite establishments, however, is not just the acquisition of competence but, equally, the acquisition of connections. 53 Managerialism has indeed triumphed in France. 54 The as Groenewegen explains, 'When someone changes jobs, then automatically another member of the same corps takes his or her place'. 56 The institutional nature of the ties that bind the French business elite together is historically determined, French business leaders having a long-standing preference, as Cassis and Bussière observe, for institutions over markets. 57 Despite the triumph of managerialism in France, there is a strong sense in which this preference endures. The pursuit of critical mass, the conviction that size matters, has characterised both French and British economic development in the post-war period. Table 5 
Conclusion: the Enduring Particularities of the Managerial Revolution in France
This article confirms the limitations of universal theories of the managerial revolution. As
Penrose states, 'universal truths without reference to time and space are unlikely to characterise economic affairs'. 60 That said, the intellectual climate in which Chandler began was one in which it was generally believed that industrial economies would eventually converge on the American model. 61 We propose here an alternative approach that recognises the economic and social realities of different national business systems. France's post-war economic recovery, and also the beneficiaries. 66 Despite
Europeanisation, and globalisation, bringing undeniable change in governance practices and investment patterns, establishment solidarity, self-serving, and sustained and supported by the state, arguably remains as powerful a force at the heart of the French corporate economy as ever it was. Note: A power score was calculated for each company based upon equally weighted values for total capital employed, turnover, net profit and number of employees. Each company was then assigned to a single industry group wherein power scores were combined and percentage shares of total corporate power calculated. 
Notes:
The procedures for the determination of corporate power are defined in the note to Table 2 Where CV = coefficient of variation and N = 100.
If power were divided equally between the Top 100 companies in either France or the UK, then C would equal 0.01 -the reciprocal of the number of firms in the sample. The more unequally power is distributed, the higher C becomes. 
